20080915

The Biology of Horror (Jack Morgan, 2002)



Jack Morgan. The Biology of Horror: Gothic Literature and Film. Southern Illinois University Press, 2002. (pp.272)



Classic “high” literary gothicism, with its assertive physicalness, may then be viewed as a modality within the historical Romantic project, though grotesque imagining was alive of course well before the Romantic sensibility took it up and has continued to flourish well after Romanticism’s heyday. Through its particular narrative strategies, horror awakens thought shockingly to its intimate and inescapable connectedness to the flesh and to pain, to the kind of recognition Astrid, the narrator of Janet Fitch’s recent novel White Oleander, experiences while trying to comfort a friend in a maternity ward (p.5)



Symbols themselves are coming to be recognized as issuing from and circling back to physical embodiment—“meanings arise through body and brain” (Lakoff 495). While there are obviously other dimensions involved in horror, the present book proposes the primacy of this one, positing biomorphic imagination as critically underlying gothic fiction’s Dark Romantic project and of macabre literature in general, and to a degree and depth that goes beyond the conscious, thematic level. (p. 5-6)




Films such as The Exorcist, Rosemary’s Baby, The Stand, ’Salem’s Lot, and Stigmata, for example, all imagine diabolical assertions upon the physical body of a young woman, suggesting an arch assault on the wellsprings of human life. In the film Seven (1995), the human monster’s obsession with souls stained by the seven deadly sins is enacted in grotesque torture dramas played out on his victims bodies, and significantly, his ultimate prey is a pregnant young woman. Our “psychological” fears are realized in very physical terms. What John Donne wrote in “The Ecstasy” of love might be said appropriately of horror as well: Its “mysteries in souls do grow / But yet the body is his book” (132). (p.6)




Most studies of horror do somewhere reference its bodily focus, of course; feminist criticism almost invariably remarks it, but the concern of most criticism is rarely principally that.4 The over-psychologizing of the horror mode in critical analysis may in part reflect the fallacy earlier noted in terms of which thinking is regarded as functioning “in some ghostly realm independent of the body.” (p.6) Rereading a book outside the gothic field at the same time, C. L. Barber’s Shakespeare’s Festive Comedies, I was struck by Barber’s reference to the fact that those late medieval factions opposed to the Dionysian spirit of spring holidaytended to emphasize “the mortality implicit in vitality” (10). The phrase seemed to situate a critical opposition, one that brought the horror sensibility and logic into focus over against the comic (p. 6-7)



What was referenced here was the body not in an individualistic sense but as part of the larger life schema—diurnal, seasonal, agricultural, all of which, as Barber shows, were bound up in traditional premodern and early modern holiday and festival. An ancient ritual synthesis seemed to suggest itself: the conjunction, as in the couplet quoted, of Thanatos and Eros, the implications of worms and morbidity on the one hand and of women walking delightfully alive and majestic on the other. They are the farthest apart images imaginable, and at the same time they are part of an intimate continuity (p.7)




The Biology of Horror seems to me now largely a gloss or attempted elaboration upon Barber’s phrase in terms of comedy and horror, fertility and its antagonist. His book, which in many respects anticipated the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, which was not to appear in translation until 1968, led me to return to others of a complementary perspective, notably Susanne Langer’s Feeling and Form (1953), which had appeared the same year as Barber’s study, as well as to Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His World itself. I think that horror can be productively analyzed in terms of the kind of model Langer proposes for comedy; horror indeed embodies a dark foil for comic regeneration, subverting Eros and all it implies. If the quest romance, as Northrop Frye argues, represents ritually the victory of fertility over the Waste Land, horror situates dark romance’s inversion of those terms and the privileging of various sinister elements antagonistic to the quest project; Fryenotes, for instance, giants, ogres, witches, and magicians (Anatomy 193). Horror, despite its often obscene depravity, is driven by an antierotic, and fertility-adversarial perspective. Though the Dark Romantic impulse shares the broader Romantic concern with physicality, it is with the menacing aspects of physicality. Increasing freedom in publication has in fact drawn the gothic’s aversion to the organic out to the point of such over-the-top vileness that one hesitates to quote hard-core examples—the loathsome necromancy experiments in Brian Lumley’s Necroscope, for instance. …The scatological extravagance of this surpasses even Grand Guignol reach and is, to be sure, a long way from the restrained subtlety of Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw, say, but one is not deploring literary decline here; Barker’s writing, in this early novel at least, is of an exemplary elegance for that matter. His work is in a line distinct, however, from that of the genteel ghost story cultivated by writers such as James and Edith Wharton; the menace in Barker’s stories does not take the form of shadows on mansion walls and eerie revenant forms crossing aristocratic lawns in the moonlight. His novel is a contemporary Melmoth the Wanderer, Dracula, or The Monk—visceral, excessive, bloody, and obscene. The macabre author’s study is, like Frankenstein’s laboratory, “a workshop of filthy creation” (32) (p.9)



The chapters in The Biology of Horror discuss different thematic elements of the horror invention rubric—malevolent locale, pestilence, lethargy, infertility, and so forth—in terms of their broad biological implications. It is important to emphasize, however, that these elements intercontextualize and reinforce one another; horror categories bleed into one another as it were. The book’s concluding chapter considers the matter of horror’s possible therapeutic function, related to the question of what accounts for the esoteric pleasure we take in reading this species of literature and viewing the analogous cinematic works. (Though the traditional usage, “pleasure” may not be the best word—Emily Dickinson notes, I think more precisely, the tendency of horror to captivate [129]. The question might better be put in terms of why horror does captivate and fascinate, why it can be so hypnotic, seductive, and intriguing). What would lead Sir Walter Scott, for instance, to praise the beneficial qualities of Mrs. Radcliffe’s—for its time—morbid work? I would mention finally that this book casts a wide speculative net and ranges around and about a good deal in space and time; it is not intended to be a narrowly focused literary critical monograph. My main justification for that is the fact that, as Lovecraft notes, some of the most significant horror work is found outside what is usually viewed as the gothic or horror literature canon, in scattered fragments set in contexts not always definable as literary gothic (Supernatural 16).



The notorious Nazi documentary film The Eternal Jew, for example, makes use of the repulsion triggers perfected in landmarks of macabre German expressionism such as F. W. Murnau’s 1922 Nosferatu and Fritz Lang’s 1931 M and manipulates the camera-technical horror savvy such films pioneered.7 It employs the defining gothic strategy discussed earlier— that of bypassing the rational and addressing the visceral instead—and points up the dangerous political and totalitarian possibilities of manipulated horror imagination. The film’s strategy is to go to the heart of elemental dread—the fear of contamination, the central theme of Lovecraft’s classic The Shadow over Innsmouth, for example. Images of healthy, outdoor German life—grazing lambs and so on—are juxtaposed to dreadful scenes of kosher animal slaughter by rabbis, images of cockroaches, and especially—shades of Nosferatu—of rats swarming and scavenging en masse. The Eternal Jew may even have been consciously conceived to be viewed in a mental montage with, and therebyto capitalize on, the lingering horror images the German public retained from Murnau’s film of almost twenty years earlier. That the producers of The Eternal Jew had such associational strategies in mind is suggested by their use of actual footage from M, a terribly disquieting film that, like Nosferatu, had made a deep impression on the public. The famous scene in which Peter Lori (“the Jew Peter Lori” the voice-over says) pleads grotesquely for understanding of the heinous child murders he has committed is included in The Eternal Jew. In the film, the Jew is a vampire, sucking the blood of Aryan Europe, and like the vampire of Murnau’s film, the “Jews” in the 1940 film are meant to evoke rodents and the medieval epidemic associations still vivid in the European imagination. The latter connection is in fact explicitly made in the voice-over. Like Nosferatu, the haunted “Jewish” figures are meant to suggest slippage to a lower order of life—they are drawn as stooped and skulking, sliding along the walls of sordid, sinister places, their eyes derelict and resentful. In fact, the following description of Murnau’s vampire Nosferatu by Gilberto Perez, if one didn’t know better, could be taken as descriptive of the “Jews” in the Nazi production: They are “loomingly thin” presenting a “skeletal aspect” and “monstrously suggest a cross between a human skeleton and a rat.” Their resemblance to rats “makes more pronounced [their] association with pestilence” (Perez 124). By cutting from the haggard “Jews” to teeming rats, and back, the Nazi film suggests their association in squalor—the two are equated with vile, contaminating conditions into which, it is implied, the film viewers, be they less than vigilant (read vigilantes), may slide. The insinuation in The Eternal Jew is that the Jew is like Nosferatu: “rats he carries with him.”8 The present book also references writing in nonfictional epidemic, martyrological (p.10-11)




The bricolage character of the modality itself leads to critical traveling as well. Maggie Kilgour, in The Rise of the Gothic Novel, notes that gothic fiction “feeds upon and mixes a wide range of literary sources out of which it emerges and from which it never fully disentangles itself. . . . The form is itself a Frankenstein’s monster, assembled out of bits and pieces of the past” (4). The emergence of an energetic film branch of horror invention has further complicated the genre’s profile so that by now discussion of salient horror tropics occasions a knitting together of many sundry strings, often from dissimilar historical locations, which may sometimes need to be discussed in close proximity. (p. 11)



Ezra Pound’s observation that all agesare contemporaneous is perhaps especially true of horror; he added that in terms of literature, “many dead men are our grandchildren’s contemporaries” (6). Recent movie history would seem to bear this out; thanks to the influence of film, exorcism and stigmata, for example, are arguably more a part of the American popular cultural imagination today than they were one hundred years ago, and the currently popular television “crossing over” genre, purporting to contact the dead, recapitulates Victorian theosophy. Recent movie history would seem to bear this out; thanks to the influence of film, exorcism and stigmata, for example, are arguably more a part of the American popular cultural imagination today than they were one hundred years ago, and the currently popular television “crossing over” genre, purporting to contact the dead, recapitulates Victorian theosophy.





CRITICISM ADDRESSING THE LITERATURE OF HORROR IS notoriously lacking in an established terminology. Efforts to elucidate its typological profile can become very nuanced and have tended to cause, as S. T. Joshi notes, “an irremediable confusion of terms such as horror, terror, the supernatural, fantasy, the fantastic, ghost story, Gothic fiction, and others” (2). Chris Baldick, in his introduction to The Oxford Book of Gothic Tales, having noted that his anthology attempts to set forth “a relatively pure line of shorter Gothic fiction,” adds the following reservation: “I am aware, however, that a broader definition of Gothic is possible and have at some points slackened the line to accommodate this view” (xxii). Noel Carroll writes that in terms of the theory propounded in his book, “most of Poe’s work does not fit into the genre of horror” (215n). Linda Badley calls The Silence of the Lambs a Gothic Romance (144). And so on.1 Early high Gothic literature tended toward a realist or quasi-realist expression, toward the natural supernatural. The supernatural as such was played down or, ultimately, as in Radcliffe, turned out to have been only apparently extra-natural. The uncanny was likely to work up from the grass roots; Count Dracula, for instance, a demon emergent from the central European folk-mind, is living-dead, not dead and returning from a supernatural realm. The character of Satan itself suggests a chthonic derivation and lends itself readily enough to representations such as Stephen King’s Randall Flagg, in The Stand, who is a devil if not the Devil manifested as a suave, or would-be suave, redneck. Frankenstein too is a natural phenomenon, a “creature made of clay,” as it were. The ability of horror to function in the physical without resort to the deus ex machina possibilities of the supernatural is evident as well in films such as The First Deadly Sin, Psycho, and Silence of the Lambs, with their human monsters—Daniel Blank, Norman Bates, and Hannibal Lecter. (p.40)

20080906

Heidegger for Beginners (LeMay, 1994)


Eric C. Lemay. Heidegger for Beginners. London: Writer and Reader, 1994.

"Technology will never allow itself to be overcome by man. That would mean, after all, that man was the master of Being".

According to Heidegger, philosophy's focus on humanity has helped cause the crisis of the modern world. Rather than recognising our place in the world, our status as one being among other beings, we have turned the world into something that exists for and because of us. Treating planet Earth as an expendable resource.

Heidegger says that many of the world's atrocities can be traced back to the supposedly harmless philosophical belief that we human beings are special, we give the world a 'frame of reference'. The connection between our technological world view and the concept of Being passed through Occidental philosophy.

Socrates - The unexamined life is not worth living
Parmenides - Can we come to know that which does not exist?
Pythagoras - Could Mathematics lie at the core of the universe?
Heraclitus - How do we comprehend a world that constantly changes?

Most relevant work comes from Plato and his 'Theory of Ideas' - each existing thing has a form - Anamnesis. Over the next two thousand years a list fo distinguished philosophers would refine, refute and transform Plato's ideas.

René Descates (1596-1650) and the absolute axiom 'Cogito, ergo sum' stems from a process he called 'radical doubt', his foundation for absolute knowledge. Jean-Jaques Rousseau (1712-1778) proposes the universal soul based on the Self and on Nature. In different ways, George Berkeley (1685-1753), John Locke (1632-1776) and David Hume (1711-1776) though Rousseau was a deluded idealist and stated that 'we know things from experiencing them, and then using this information as a base which to build more complex knowledge - not from going deep into the corridors of our own minds'. These Empiricist thinkers denied the grandiose of Rationalists thinkes such as Rousseau and Descartes (they argued the empiricists ignored the role of the mind in witnessing, recording and analysing sensory experience).

Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) proclaimed that the Self had innate structures that is used to take in all sensory information. He agreed with the Empiricists' claim that sensory experience is where we derive our knowledge but, at the same time, he gave Rationalists credit for realising that the human mind filters every experience in its own unique way.Along with structure like Time and Space, Kant came up with categories such as Unity, Reality, Substance and Possibility, which all help us filter experience. Kant presumed that we all have the same filters and , thus, by examining the categories of his own mind, Kant believed, like Rousseau, that he could generate universal human knowledge. In the realm of Ethics, Kant believed that all moral behaviour could be generated from a principle he called the 'Categorical Imperative'. In attempting to develop a flawless, hemertic system to explain the world, Kant ignored everyday facts like, people not always tell the truth.

Friedrich Nietzsch (1844-1900) took this line of critique to the extreme purporting Kant's philosophy as the most far-reaching false assumption in the history of philosophy. He says claims of Truth are claims of Power. All the lwas, canons and doctrines of groups claiming truth, according to Nietzsch were ways of oppressing our higher instincts. For him, the most coercive and oppressive claim to absolute truth was Christianity and proclaimed God is dead. To follow such laws means to conform to a 'Slave Morality'. In his denial of truth, Nietzsch rejected conventional moral values. Ideas like Kant's universal categories are not truths but functions of what Nietzsch called 'Will to Power'. Every organism lives to increase its life force.

Even before Nietzsch, the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard threw into doubt ideas of truth, knowledge and God. He said we cannot know anything universal, anything tha transcends time because we are finite beings. He did not say God was dead and believed that subjectivity of the truth is important, so we must make 'Leaps of Faith'.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) contributes to debunk assumptions of all-encompassing philosophical systems, he believed that scientific knowledge was very useful but, did not help to understand 'Human Concerns'. To solve this discrepancy Husserl developed a philosophical method called Phenomenology, in order to describe 'experience' or 'awareness' of things in a manner which did not reduce them to scientific data.Husserl rescued everyday experience from the reductive limitations of science and developed a new, rigorous method od establishing knowledge. This method would inspire thinkers who felt the scientific approach to the world was impoverished.

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was one of them. In 1927 he published Being and Time, the central focus of Heidegger's work brings us back to the fundamental mystery of existence. According to him, ever since philosophers began asking questions about the world, they overlooked the fact that the world exists. Since Plato Philosophers have been focusing on the things of the world but not on the world in itself.

The significance of this basic condition of existence he dubbed 'Being', while 'beings' are those entities which exist in the world. Opposite to the idea of Being there is 'The Nothing' or non-existence. In between these two possibilities there are temporal 'beings'. Previous approaches, such as Plato's and Descartes, ignored the everyday world and gone in serach of some extraordinary principle that would explain the world.

Heidegger decides to do a phenomenological investigation of humans in their average-everydayness which he calls 'Dasein' (translates as being there). The event of such existence is our 'Thrown-ness', no one is an autonomous individaul, free to choose their own way of existence. We belong to cultures and our behaviours derive from our social environment. Universal system do not account for different practices, thinking among various cultures. There can be no 'being there' if the world does not exist, Daisen and the world are the same. Rules for behaviours are all contingent elements of various cultures. Modes of existence are categorised by Heidegger as undifferentaited (does not question position in life), inauthentic (substitutes one type of life for another, anxiety, 'Fallen-ness') and the authentic mode of existence. That is, to take resposibility for the life you are living, realise that no-one is accountablefor it except you, you are a being-towards-death.

This recognition of meaninglessness has great consequences fo the individual. For Existentialists, we filter the world through language, in a manner similar to Kant's categories, which fosters a particular experience of the world. For Existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) 'existence preceeds essence', this is similar to Heidegger's insight that a person is first and foremost a product of the world. But for Sartre this means that humans have no 'pregiven nature'. While Heidegger thinks that the individual was merely a part of his environment. Satre draws an opposite conclusion, that the individual was an autonomous self. Heidegger thinks this is just another version of Descartes philosophy: a view which centres the world around the individual, he claims that his Daisen stands humble in relation to the world (which makes beings possible).

According to Heidegger it is incorrect to centre philosophy around one particular being and that this has caused the crisis of the modern world. Technology as a particular way of seeing the world and the entire world as 'stuff' for consumption. Heidergger's notion of 'Bestand' translates as 'stock' or 'standing reserve'. The abuses we commit against Nature arouse from this technological attitude and they derive from our self-centred world-view, the world exists to be used. Many of the world atrocities can be traced back to this supposedly harmless philosophy that we are individuals providing reference for the world.

Only by realising that humanity is one being among many and merely part of an all-encompassing Being ca we begin to live in harmony with the rest of the world. But technology keeps us from recognising Being. when we see the world with the lens of technology, we preclude the possibility of recognising the splendor of the world, of Being. How do we attaing such relationship with the world? How do we attain an attitude that is not technological? By recognising ourselves as Daisen and not the 'thinking thing'. We are all in a position to realise that certain social practices contrubute or not to that relationship. Language is a central preoccupation of Heidegger, specially Geeek. He criticiese the impoverishment of language when it should be the 'House of the Being', the living memory of our existence.

(my note: Heidegger's discourse seems very fruitful for an 'ecological' interpretation the world, and it can be used as argument to put restrains in the development of poor countries. The conservation of the Daisen can be used as an instrument of power, a reason to force developing countries to produce, for example, clean and expensive energy.)